shared the opinion that the Turkish government could count on British support only so long as it ratifîed the treaty of Sevres vvithout delay. 3 Even on the issue of the renevval of official diplomatic relations with the Turks, the British pushed the view that they could not be renewed until after the treaty of Sevres had been ratified. 4 The signing of the treaty of Sevres encumbered the İstanbul authorities with the desperate need of justifying themselves against their critics. They were driven to issue proclamations not only to the Anatolian people but also to the leaders of Müslim countries to explain the reasons which obliged them to sign the peace treaty and the 'evils' that would result from supporting the Nationalist Movement. 5 They also required the Allies to secure their ratification of the treaty before the Turks did. Damad Ferid Paşa held to the argument that if the Sultan-Caliph, Mehmed Vahideddin, were to ratify it before the Allies on their side had done anything the Sultan's position vis-â-vis his own subjects would be gravely Ankara government declared the Sultan and his government to be a virtual prisoner of the Allies and organised opposition to the İstanbul government and resistance to the Allies and their peace terms. The finances of Damad Ferid Paşa's government were a mlsery. Money in hand on 31 August was about £500,000 Turkish. Monthly requirements were about £1,300,000 Turkish. Details in Br. Doc compromised. 6 However, as far as the British were concerned it would not be possible to ratify the treaty until the British Parliament met again. 7 The Foreign Office (FO) members were clever enough to get the hint from Damad Ferid Paşa that he assumed that the British would not be able to ratify the treaty until October 19 when the British Parliament reassembled. This might create an opportunity for the Ottoman government to discuss, or preferably modify, the treaty. 8 For the İstanbul government, one of the complications arising out of the execution of the treaty concerned which body would ratify the treaty. According to the Turkish Constitution, the ratification of the peace treaty required the approval of the Parliament. But the Parliament had been dissolved by the Sultan on 11 April 1920 for a period of four months, 9 it had not yet been recalled. Damad Ferid Paşa, therefore, came up with the suggestion that the treaty could be ratified by the Sultan alone. However, he needed British assistance to lessen the burden of such an unconstitutional act. 10 The British High Commissioner in İstanbul, Admiral de Robeck, admitted that the ratification of the treaty by the Sultan, which the Grand Vizier was set on, was the only practical way to achieve ratification. Robeck also believed that Damad Ferid Paşa's government should be strongly supported in this matter, since this course was so clearly unconstitutional that no other Grand Vizier might be willing to follow it." At this point Damad Ferid Paşa occupied, in British eyes, the unique position of being the only person from whom the Allies could get the treaty ratified.
The question of making peace with Turkey had, in the Allied view, been settled with the signing of the treaty of Sevres and now it was turn for its ratification by the Turks. The Grand Vizier aimed to ratify the treaty with the fewest disadvantages and then get Allied assistance to restore his government's prestige both in the country and in the Müslim vvorld. At this point the main issue was to pacify AnatoUa prior to the ratification. For this purpose, Damad Ferid Paşa followed two separate courses:
• peaceful means; • forceful measures.
In the first course, he extended an amnesty to the Nationalists, except the ring-leaders of the Movement. In the second course he tried to dispose a force of repression -with British assistance-to impose the peace treaty conditions upon the Nationalists.
This article aims to give a brief account of Damad Ferid Paşa's attempts both to eliminate the legal obstacles with respect to ratification and to crush the Nationalist Movement. It also gives special emphasis to the views of varying description (clerks, counsellors and assistant secretaries) of the FO, especially those of D.G. Osbourne The Nationalist resistance to the authority and policies of the treaty of Sevres and the Allied pressure for its immediate application forced the İstanbul government to attempt to restore order in Anatolia. Damad Ferid Paşa on one hand proposed an amnesty which, he believed, would bring about the submission of the Nationalists with moderate tendencies to the Sultan and his government. On the other hand, he plotted against the extremists by other means. However, both courses failed. He was given no British assistance as both the British FO and the three Allied High Commissioners in İstanbul were eventually inclined to think that a mission of reconciliation to Anatolia was necessary and less risky, and would have better chances of success. The view that the İstanbul government should form a mission to send to Anatolia in order to make the Nationalists understand the treatment to which Turkey vvould be exposed if they persisted in resisting to the Allied terms of peace, held the day in the end.
I. Amnesty
Damad Ferid Paşa proposed, as a preliminary measure, to renew the offer of an amnesty, which had been published about six months earlier, to ali Nationalists, except the leaders. 13 His Minister of the Interior, Reşid Mümtaz Paşa, was of the opinion that the root of the unrest in Anatolia was the occupation of Turkish territory by the Greeks and that the rebel leaders had also been encouraged by foreign povvers. The solution to the problem was, therefore, not a matter of internal politics so much as a movement against the terms of the peace treaty itself, and it was not within the power of the İstanbul government to satisfy the demands of the rebels. The only course to be pursued was to try once again to enlighten the Anatolian population as to the true state of affairs, and if that had no effect, to proceed to forcible measures. With regard to the question of an amnesty, Reşid Mümtaz Paşa was confident that the population generally was imbued with sentiments of loyalty but had been obliged to submit to force. The promulgation of an amnesty vvould therefore be both a wise and timely measure.
14 Accordingly, Reşad Halis Bey, the Turkish Minister at Berne, had already pushed the view on Lord Derby, the British ambassador in Paris, that many vvould take the opportunity of the pardon offered by the Sultan to renevv their allegiance to him, although there vvas a large group of Nationalist leaders who would undoubtedly resist, and they were incited to do so by French financial interests.
15
Damad Ferid Paşa and the Sultan hoped that the proclamation of an amnesty would divide the Nationalists and make them to submit to the central administration. The cabinet council of ministers held on 1 September was informed that a general amnesty was to be extended -upon the Sultan's desire-to ali Nationalist rebels before military operations were undertaken against them. The discussions on the issue of a general amnesty, hovvever, resulted in the resignations on 19 September of the two ministers in the cabinet: Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Şeyhülislam, and Cemal Bey, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture. Both were party men of the Moderate Entente Liberal Party, i. e., one of the two factions into which the original anti-Unionist Entente Liberal had broken after the Allied occupation of İstanbul in March 1920. 16 Both ministers claimed to have abandoned Damad Ferid Paşa because of his slackness vis-â-vis the Nationalists in Anatolia. 17 Upon their resignations, the Grand Vizier published a communique accusing the two ministers of having delayed measures to restore order in Anatolia by refusing to agree to the renewal of amnesty, which the remainder of the cabinet had agreed to.
18
The two ministers' resignations due to their opposition to the proclamation of an amnesty was officially announced in the local press on 21 September. 19 The FO generally regarded the resignations as opposition to a weakening of the idea of repressing the Nationalists by force.
20
Hovvever, the British High Commission noticed that, vvhilst Cemal had always been a consistent advocate of forceful measures, there had been practically no previous indication that his opinions were shared by the Şeyhülislam, who, in fact, had on more than one occasion expressed himself as being in favour of milder measures. For instance, at the cabinet council of 7 September Cemal had openly expressed his disagreement with the proposals for an amnesty on the ground that it would be interpreted as a sign of vveakness, but the Şeyhülislam had spoken in favour of the measure. His sudden change of heart might, according to the British Intelligence report, be attributed to one of those manoeuvres characteristic oftheELP.
21
Damad Ferid Paşa's chances of effecting reconciliation with the Nationalists was now even more remote due to the dissension in his own cabinet. Although the cabinet accepted the amnesty unanimously, it would certainly be impossible for his cabinet, which had effected numerous Nationalist arrests and handed down many drastic sentences to persons arrested on old or very vague charges, 22 to make the Nationalist leaders believe in its pretentious and insincere leniency. Damad Ferid Paşa therefore continued to stick to his forcible measures. He proposed to recruit forces from areas purged of the Nationalists and to attack from Ismid and on the Black Sea. He was sure the men could be found, but nothing could be done vvithout Allied help, especially of a financial nature. 23 He urged the view on the British that it was in the interests of the Allies, or in ali events of Britain and France, to assist a government which was pledged to observe the treaty of Sevres against a group of adventures who, if left untackled in Anatolia, would be a permanent nuisance to the British and French in the Arab countries, to the Transcaucasian states and to Persia, and would continue to receive aid from the Bolsheviks. 
II. Forcible measures
Since the Nationalist forces had been defeated by the Greeks during the summer campaigns in vvestern and north-western Anatolia, 26 Damad Ferid Paşa hoped that they would also be defeated by his government if a punitive expedition accompanied by the Sultan were given a fair chance.
27
As regards the forcible suppression of the Nationalists, he tried to effect the re-organisation of the XXVth Army Corps stationed in İstanbul. In this regard, there were two main obstacles in the way of his government. First, the İstanbul government had to be quite certain of success. Secondly, the government needed to obtain Allied permission for the conversion of the existing formations into two special compound divisions totalling 25,000 men. The government depended primarily on British assistance to get the Allied authorisation for the formation of these forces. 28 The French Premier was not really enthusiastic about the project of raising forces. British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon, on the other hand, had no objection to the Grand Vizier's raising the forces at his disposal to 15,000 men with the authorisation of the inter-Allied military commanders -provided the latter were satisfied that these forces would not join the Nationalists. Hovvever, he objected to the infringement of the treaty involved in acceding to the Turkish request to raise a force of two divisions totalling 25,000.
29
Immediately after the resignation of the two ministers in his cabinet the Grand Vizier addressed a long note to the High Commissioners in which he asked for a loan of £T.20,000,000, and outlined military proposals for an offensive against the Nationalists.
30 Damad Ferid Paşa's proposals of a military and financial nature asserted:-(a). 15,000 troops and 25,000 gendarmes to be recruited in small areas under effective authority of the government and areas occupied by the Greek vendettas ceded to them; (b). Guns and material held by the Allies since the armistice of Mudros, signed on 30 October 1918, to be placed at the disposal of the government; (c). Naval convoys for transports carrying government troops; (d). Military foreign officers for gendarmerie and other services, as contemplated in the treaty; (e). Loan by the Allies of £T.25,000,000, being estimated cost of three months' operations with a margin for unforeseen expenses.
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The Grand Vizier's proposals were received by Robeck on 20 September. Robeck then exchanged views with General Wilson, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Army of the Black Sea, and asked the following questions: In reply, Wilson expressed his opinion that the organisation of the forces would take at least 6 months, but that if they were properly handled there would be little danger of their going över to the Nationalists. To Wilson, a properly organised government force would probably find little diffîculty in defeating the Nationalist armies, provided the Bolsheviks did not give considerable active and material assistance.
33
In the FO, Edmonds was of the belief that the danger seemed to be not so much that individual members of the force would desert to Mustafa Kemal, but rather that a Turkish government of Nationalist tendencies might allow the force to be used for purposes which the Allies could not approve. 34 Osbourne was of the opinion that a well-armed Turkish force could suppress the Nationalist Movement unless considerable assistance were to be supplied by the Bolsheviks. But the ultimate disposal of the Turkish Armenian vilayets (cities) might be a difficult issue, as the Allies could not foresee how Turkish troops would fight for the dismemberment of their country. 35 Fitzmaurice urged the necessity for the British to act in harmony, especially with the French, in giving moral and material assistance to the İstanbul government to carry out the treaty. Fitzmaurice believed that the Greeks only wanted the treaty executed and presumably would be delighted to see the Sultan's government do so, or to keep it with supplies to achieve that object. 36 Hankey and Tilley advocated that the Allies should consult Venizelos about getting the treaty executed with the help of raising forces against the Nationalists. The War Office (WO) had no objection, from the military point of view, to permission being granted to the İstanbul government to raise two divisions, totalling 25,000 men for repression of the Nationalist Movement, though this would constitute an infringement of the peace terms. In the army council's point of view, the peace terms could be enforced in Anatolia much more easily by the İstanbul government than by an Allied force, though the Greeks might not be favourable to such an arrangement.
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The Grand Vizier's note sounded like a formal cali upon the Allies to support the İstanbul government in every way, if they wanted it to execute their treaty. 39 But the High Commissioners agreed on 21 September that the note was not in the last degree practical. They leaned tovvards the idea of a mission of pacifıcation to Ankara instead. But the Grand Vizier, when verbally approached on the subject by French High Commissioner Defrance, expressed his doubt as to the success of a purely Turkish mission. The High Commissioners were indecisive on this point. 40 By the mid-autumn of 1920, the punitive expedition against the Nationalists could not get beyond the paper stage and it remained doubtful whether such an expedition would ever proceed to Anatolia. 41 Damad Ferid Paşa's inability in handling the chaos in Anatolia and the fînancial crisis made his government's already difficult position completely untenable. The number of persons who took the view that Damad Ferid Paşa should be got rid of at once, or else induced to ratify the treaty quickly and then made to give way to a modest person, such as ex-Grand Viziers Tevfik Paşa or Marshal İzzet Paşa, was on the increase in British political circles. Following the Greek campaigns in the summer of 1920, the Allied High Commissioners had agreed in principle to give support for a mission of pacification since they considered that a further Greek advance into Anatolia would endanger the treaty by intensifying the anti-Greek feeling of the Anatolian people vvhich had already reached a dangerous point since the Greek occupation of Smyrna on 15 May 1919. 43 Assuming that Mustafa Kemal's military position was desperate and that Mustafa Kemal was in fear of the exiled Ünionist leader Enver Paşa's replacing him, the FO members, too, leaned towards the alternative of detaching him and his more moderate adherents from the extremists who were prepared to sacrifîce Turkey to the Enver-Bolshevik ambitions. 44 However, it took quite a long time to reach a consensus among the Allies on the nature of the mission to be sent to Ankara.
42

B. QUESTION OF MEDIATION BETWEEN İSTANBUL AND ANKARA
Meanwhile, complieations increased due to the government's impotence to take active measures against the Nationalists, as well as the actions of the Greek authorities in the occupied territories. 45 Officers and men for the projected punitive expedition to Anatolia had not come forward in adequate numbers. It seemed that the only way to avoid the new dangers would be a radical change in the administration. 46 proceed without definite authority from his government. 47 His hesitancy might also be due to the dilemma that while the Italian representatives already passed the information to the İstanbul government that Italy was in favour of sending a mission of pacifîcation to the Nationalists to put an end to the chaotic state of affairs in Turkey and to maintain friendly relations with the Caliphate, 48 the Italian government had actually no determined vievv as to the efficacy and scope of a mission to Anatolia yet.
I. Despatch of a Mission of Reconciliation to Anatolia
Throughout the months following the signing of the treaty of Sevres, the contrasting expectations and methods of British and French policies, as well as those of Italy and Greece, över the Turkish question had stili not ceased. Nor was the further use of Greek armed forces practicable. The British felt that the Allies had now been left with principally three options. They could either take an active hand in attempting to unify Turkey, they could maintain the existing Ottoman government or they could change it. 49 British politicians and diplomats were cautious about further straining British prestige in the Müslim world as well as providing any kind of support, including money and officers, to the İstanbul government. Nor, unless circumstances forced them to, did the British wish to destroy the basis of the existing treaty by further utilising the Greeks and the additional need to compensate them which this would entail. On the other hand, Defrance, who believed that Damad Ferid Paşa's personality was one of the greatest obstacles to the union between İstanbul and Ankara, suggested that Damad Ferid Paşa must go. Defrance was lukewarm about any form of negotiations with the Nationalist leaders themselves, and equally lukewarm about boldly using the only threat which the Allies could use, that of a further Greek advance vvhich he described as the Allies' only potential vveapon. While Defrance demurred at the idea of giving the mission the character of formal negotiations with the Nationalist leaders, Arlotta was personally of the opinion that, should a mission be sent to Anatolia, it would stand a better chance of success if composed of, or at TheTtalian note of 10 September proposed that instead of a purely Turkish mission, either an Allied mission should be despatched, or the Turkish mission should be accompanied by representatives of the Allies.
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The draft French reply of 20 September to the Italian note accepted the principle of a mission, but stated that if despatched by an İstanbul government, like the one represent by Damad Ferid Paşa, it might meet with a rebuff likely to endanger any chance of a compromise. The French put forward the view that in order to promote the success of the mission, it should not be composed of, or at least accompanied by, Allied representatives. The French government desired the British government to work to bring about the formation of a new Turkish cabinet to supervise the constitution of the Anatolian mission and the means of meeting the financial requirements of the government.
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Opinion at the FO as regards the method of securing ratification and the role of Damad Ferid Paşa in it varied. The head of foreign affairs, Lord Curzon, was resolute that delay in the ratification of the treaty was a primary cause of continued dissension in Turkey. If Damad Ferid Paşa refused to ratify the treaty, it would then be time to find a successor who would be more amenable. 53 The send a mission of appeasement to Mustafa Kemal. The most important object for the British to secure, hovvever, was stili the ratification of the treaty by the existing Turkish government. The French opinion that Damad Ferid Paşa vvas the obstacle to ratification and reconciliation vvith the Ankara government, vvas found by Osbourne to be 'dubious' as regards the first. Osbourne believed that reconciliation vvith the Nationalists and the establishment of some form of united government vvas the primary necessity, but this might entail a delay in the ratification. No nevv government could approach Mustafa Kemal if at the same time they vvere ratifying the treaty. In Osbourne's belief, Mustafa Kemal should be convinced of the necessity for ratification, and acceptance of the treaty by a nevv representative Chamber should be carried out, even though it might be a further cause of delay. Osbourne suggested that Damad Ferid Paşa should be induced to ratify the treaty at once and then disappear and leave it to a successor to appease the Nationalists. The danger of this, hovvever, vvould be that the treaty vvould have been accepted by one government and might be repudiated by a future representative government. Osbourne regretted that the British could not invite Mustafa Kemal himself from Ankara to İstanbul. 54 Fitzmaurice shared similar vievvs to those of Robeck that it vvas difficult to find any successor to Damad Ferid Paşa vvho vvould or could ratify the treaty vvithout revision, especially in the matters of Smyrna and Tlırace. 55 Fitzmaurice had no objection to sending a mission to Anatolia accompanied by Allied representatives, provided such arrangements vvere made as to reasonably exclude the likelihood of their being kidnapped by the Nationalist forces. 56 Hankey believed that after the İstanbul government ratified the treaty, the Allies could immediately aftervvards go to the formation of a nevv government to get into touch vvith Mustafa Kemal and to secure the pacification of Anatolia. But, if the İstanbul government refused to ratify the treaty, the Allies must then find a government that vvould. In Hankey's opinion, the mistake in sending a mission to Anatolia before ratification vvould be 'inadmissible', since it vvould open the door to bargaining vvith Mustafa Kemal vvho vvould probably make his agreement to ratification conditional upon modifıcations of the treaty. question of vvhether the British government wanted the treaty to stand or not. If the British government did not, he saw no better course than to let the situation rip and go from bad to worse. This was, according to Ryan, a 'gloomy prospect'. Even the Greeks could not overrun the whole of Anatolia, and beyond the limits of effective occupation the Nationalist Movement must either remain as an organised force or dissolve and leave behind it vvidespread disorder as well as a very poor government in İstanbul. Ryan, therefore, saw no hope except in artifıcially strengthening the İstanbul government by giving it strong Allied support, including financial help in some shape, if the British wanted the treaty to stand. In Ryan's opinion, no Turkish mission, whether sent by Damad Ferid Paşa or anyone else, was likely to effect anything unless it was amenable to the Nationalist wishes, i.e., modification of the treaty. 58 Ryan was quite successful in foreseeing the future developments, if the treaty were to stand as it was. However, he could not see the inevitable end that it was beyond reality for the İstanbul government to be revived, even with vast Allied assistance. While Ryan's suggestions were about to be discussed at the FO, Venizelos addressed a letter to the British Prime Minister on the subject of a further Greek advance into Anatolia.
59 Venizelos' telegram of 5 October to Lloyd George stated that the İstanbul government would be unable to reduce Mustafa Kemal and that it would be extremely dangerous to grant the permission requested by them to form new divisions, for these vvould fatally reinforce the Nationalists. The only radical remedy, according to Venizelos, would be a new campaign supported by Allied funds with the object of destroying the Nationalist forces around Ankara and the Pontus. Venizelos ended by appealing for a very prompt decision, since in a few weeks' time the winter season would set in and make a campaign almost impossible. 60 But the British administration did not regard his proposals as applicable since it seemed unlikely that the Greeks could manage a campaign before vvinter set in. It was of the opinion that Venizelos' proposals amounted to tearing up the Turkish treaty and they were not likely to be at ali acceptable to the French and Italian governments. possible Greek advance into Anatolia. Osbourne was of the opinion that, assuming that Venizelos did not demand too high a price or one entailing a modifıcation of the treaty to the detriment of Turkey (which Osbourne thought the Allies should never agree to) and that the Allied military authorities were satisfıed that the Greeks could perform the task quickly and decisively, a Greek advance into Anatolia might offer the best solution in spite of its inherent disadvantages. However, he drew attention to the danger that a new Greek advance might determine Mustafa Kemal and the now hesitating moderate element to join Kazım Karabekir Paşa 52 and threw their lot in with the Bolsheviks. It might seriously endanger both the position of Venizelos in the event of military failure as well as that of the Christians in the areas controlled by the Nationalists. It might also have disastrous effects for prestige of the İstanbul government and in İstanbul itself. Also, a further Greek advance and a possible modification of the treaty in favour of Greece would almost certainly mean a rupture with Italy över the Allies' Turkish policy since both Italy and Greece claimed the same areas in south-westem Anatolia. Osbourne, therefore, came to the conclusion that whatever decision might be taken, the mission to Anatolia should be tried first. Mustafa Kemal might even be told that the only alternative to his acceptance of the treaty and assistance in the pacifîcation of Anatolia would be further Greek operations. Thereafter, whatever the result, Osbourne thought the British should, as Ryan and Robeck suggested, assist the Turks to restore order in their own house rather than risk the doubtful alternative of further military operations which would be likely to increase the existing chaos and to revive Nationalist resistance. 63 Osbourne advised vvaiting for the reply from the High Commissioner to the FO's suggestion that a meeting should be arranged between a British officer and Kazım Karabekir Paşa with a view to opening the way to a possible understanding with the moderate Nationalists.
64 Edmonds believed that the success or failure of the despatch of a Turkish mission to the provinces depended on the prestige of the İstanbul government, and to deal with Mustafa Kemal would only result in restoring his prestige. But offîcers and officials were regularly paid, if a start were raade by restoring a tolerable administration in districts near İstanbul which had been suffering from 'Nationalist terrorism', the moderate Nationalists would have some reason to think that the best policy was to transfer their allegiance from Mustafa Kemal to the Sultan. 65 Tilley, on the other hand, gave a cold shoulder to Ryan's memorandum which, he said, did not impress him very much. Tilley was very determined that the treaty must not be altered or risked for anything. Tilley pointed out that, even without offering more to the Greeks, a fresh Greek advance could be carried out and would not have disastrous results.
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The British High Commissioner agreed with Ryan's memorandum in general. Robeck was of the opinion that, however small the chances of terminating the existing state of affairs in Anatolia and securing acceptance of the peace treaty by purely pacific means might be, an attempt to do so should be made. In forming this opinion, Robeck was greatly influenced by the consideration that it would be impossible for the İstanbul government to organise such a force in a short period of time and that without the Allied support, including considerable financial aid, it would be entirely fruitiess. 67 Meanvvhile, the Allied High Commissioners' meeting on 24 September paved the way for the elimination of Damad Ferid Paşa from the list of people who could possibly achieve ratification by pacific means. At the meeting ali were agreed that any mission to Anatolia should be sent by the Sultan and his government. Defrance considered that it should be accompanied by a certain show of force, and should proceed gradually from district to district rallying the moderate Nationalists to the Sultan. Robeck objected that this would be very slow and even disastrous if the Bolsheviks were able (e.g., as a result of peace with Poland) to give effective support to the Nationalists. The other two High Commissioners eventually concurred with Robeck's position of urging the immediate despatch by the Sultan of a Turkish mission accompanied by representatives of the High Commissioners. In the end, it was decided that the Grand Vizier should be informed on the whole subject. 68 The FO members were divided as to whether the mission should be accompanied by Allied representatives. Osbourne were not sure whether it was wise to allow Allied representatives to accompany the mission. 69 of the advantages of the mission being accompanied by the Allied representatives; he vvould not trust a purely Turkish mission. 70 The situation in İstanbul devel.oped, after Ryan's memorandum had been vvritten, on lines unfavourable to the project of despatching a mission to Anatolia by the existing Turkish government. When the political officers of the Allied High Commissions verbally approached him on 25 September, Damad Ferid Paşa took a more uncompromising line than he had done before. He told them that conciliatory methods could not usefiılly be employed to produce a settlement in Anatoîia unless the organisation of repressive forces vvas proceeded vvith concurrently, the mission vvas accompanied by Allied representatives and the Allies had no truck vvith the Nationalist leaders vvhom the İstanbul government had denounced as rebels. 71 Damad Ferid Paşa vvas of the opinion that if by accepting the demands of the Nationalists the country's interests vvould be served, the cabinet vvould immediately vvithdravv, but this vvas not the case. He vvas prepared to agree to a reconciliation vvith the Nationalist leaders themselves if they did not oppose the application of the peace treaty and submitted unreservedly to the İstanbul government. His government had decided not to send any official mission vvhatsoever to negotiate vvith the Nationalists, vvho vvere not in the least likely to accept such conditions; their attack upon Armenia in conjunction vvith the Bolsheviks further proved their intention of persisting in their uncompromising attitude. 72 In short, Damad Ferid Paşa's priority vvas to obtain Allied backing in restoring order, but, in fact, there vvas no hope for this assistance.
II. Necessity for the Elimination of Damad Ferid Paşa
Both the Sultan and his Grand Vizier vvere vvorried about the possibility of advent to povver of a government of a Nationalist complexion and pressed on the British the idea that any moderate-serving cabinet vvhich might novv take povver vvould be a merely a stepping-stone to a government of a defînitely Nationalist complexion vvhich vvould certainly 70 oppose acquiescence to the treaty. 73 Damad Ferid Paşa even hinted to Robeck that the Sultan was reaching his limits of endurance and might abdicate rather than consent to work with a government of Nationalist character. 74 In other words, Damad Ferid Paşa's only weapon against the British seemed to be the threat of the Sultan's abdication. Hovvever, it was a weapon which could easily be turned against him.
Upon the Grand Vizier's intimidation and the apparent possibility of the Sultan's abdication, the FO was resolute that they could not dare to sacrifîce the Sultan, but they could sacrifice Damad Ferid Paşa. Osbourne did not think the British could refuse to help the Sultan to leave Turkey, but the Sultan should be urged not to abdicate. 75 Edmonds believed that if the High Commissioners managed it, the French vvould have no further ground to refuse to collaborate in the İstanbul government's raising forces, and the Nationalists might in fact feel rather more inclined to accept the Sultan's authority. 76 The High Commissioners fînally decided at the meeting on 7 October to proceed at once with vvritten a communication to the İstanbul government recommending the despatch of a mission to Anatolia. 77 They also committed themselves to promise to send delegates. 78 Just before this meeting, a new element was introduced into the situation by a message from the Sultan asking the High Commissioners to visit him. The High Commissioners accepted the Sultan's offer on the condition that the audiences should be strictly private, which implied that the Grand Vizier should not be present. The High Commissioners' joint note recommending the despatch of a mission as a purely pacific experiment, and without limitation as to the persons with whom it should enter into relations, was handed to Damad Ferid Paşa on the same day and the reply concerning the intervievvs was conveyed simultaneously. The High Commissioners' interviews with the Sultan took place on 11 October and were actually final talks with the Sultan for assessing his reaction to the possibility of Damad Ferid Paşa's removal. During the intervievv the Sultan was very insistent that the mission should be sent to demand submission, not to listen to conditions. He wanted to know what was to happen if the overtures to the Nationalists were unsuccessful. 80 Referring to the High Commissioners' joint note presented to the Grand Vizier on 7 October, the Sultan expressed gratification at the willingness of the High Commissioners to attach delegates of their own to the mission. He promised to give the mission his fiili support, but observed pointedly that such support could be moral only and not material. According to Robeck, in saying so the Sultan had meant that it would have been better to adopt the plan of combining conciliation with a display of force in dealing with the Nationalists. The Sultan made a strong appeal for military assistance from the Allies via Britain, whom he described as the only country for his country to stand by. As regards the ratification of the treaty, he feared that if Turkey were to take the lead in ratifying the treaty, the reaction to his cabinet would be great. The Sultan also said that the only neutral people in Turkey were the people who were capable of nothing. 81 The Sultan's statements impressed Edmonds, who found the friendly disposition on the part of the Sultan tovvards Britain to be in a large measure genuine. Edmonds believed that the Sultan's remark that the only neutral people were those capable of nothing was only too true. The great difficulty of creating a moderate government in Turkey was that the moderate Turks did not count. 82 Osbourne realised that the Sultan wanted a mission of coercion with a stick in its hand rather than one of pacification with a white flag. But the only existing available stick was the Greek army and that cost too much. In Osbourne's belief, the Allies might perhaps wave it without having any intention of using it. 83 Tilley supported the Sultan's specific urging that the mission to the Nationalists should be told to make no concessions. 84 Meanwhile, Robeck received a letter from Defrance, on 14 October, transmitting the French government's latest instructions which suggested financial assistance to the İstanbul government, the immediate raising of the 15,000 men as contemplated in the treaty with the necessary precautions against desertions, and the installation of the International commissions immediately after the ratification. Robeck was opposed to the French programme. His objections were due to the possible risk that if the Sultan was tried too far he might abdicate, and the French proposals would increase the chance of it greatly. If the Sultan abdicated the Allies would have in the existing Heir Apparent Abdülmecid a 'successor' who was notoriously hostile to the treaty. Robeck saw that a ministry composed of puppets of the High Commissioners would ceıtainly possess no authority, and unless the British were prepared to take över the government fhemselves, the outcome would be either a government of extreme anti-Nationalist or, much more probable, a government of defînite Nationalist sympathies with whom neither the British nor the Sultan would work. 87 According to Robeck, the chances of the proposed mission's success would be much diminished by the refusal to send Allied delegates. In any case, he restated, the High Commissioners had already committed themselves to promise to send delegates. 88 Robeck then put forward an alternative policy, which propounded to: (f). Proceed with the constitution of financiai and military commissions without delay and vvithout awaiting the ratification of the treaty, even by Turkey.
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The London-based foreign-policy makers, on the other hand, generally concurred vvith the French programme, except that they could not commit themselves to financiai help. Osbourne was inclined to think the French were right in objecting to the mission being accompanied by the Allied representatives, in case of a rebuff. 90 Osbourne did not think Robeck's objections to the French programme would stand against its obvious advantages and he thought the mission to the Nationalists vvould have much greater chances of success after the ratification of the treaty and after a change of ministry. 91 He regarded the French desire of avoiding any risk of a rebuff as 'sound'. According to Osbourne, it also accorded vvith the High Commissioner's principle to avoid interference in Turkish domestic concerns. 92 Tilley vvas suspicious about the France's speaking of financiai avances to the istanbul government. He could not understand vvhat the French contemplated vvhen they spoke of avances , since there vvas no chance of financiai backing from the British and anyone else. 93 Hankey noticed that the French had decided on pressure being put upon the İstanbul government to ratify, and on the despatch of a mission, but vvithout foreign interference in it. 94 In Hankey's opinion, the British should insist on the ratification of the treaty by the İstanbul government and the acceptance of the proposal that the ratification by the Sultan and his government vvould suffice. When ratification took place the British could then decide upon the further steps to be taken, but the British might give the impression of general agreement vvith the vievvs of the French government. 95 Neither the British nor the French, Curzon imagined, vvould press for immediate ratification if it really entailed abdication of the Sultan. The British government vvould have preferred not to send a representative vvith the mission in order not to be associated vvith a possible rebuff, but if the British High Commission vvere committed to this point the FO vvould leave it to the decision of Robeck and his coileagues. Curzon hoped to ratify in London early in the existing session, and asked Robeck to use this as an argument with the İstanbul government. 96 But there was no time left to communicate vvith the İstanbul authorities. Damad Ferid Paşa saw that he was held up to contempt for abdicating his cabinet's functions. He therefore preferred to leave the reply to the High Commissioners' note to his successor and resigned on 16 October. The Sultan offered the Grand Vizierate to Tevfik Paşa. 97 Damad Ferid Paşa's resignation vvas mostly the result of his hesitation to come to terms vvith the Nationalists, as vvell as that of his hesitation in vievv of the fact that the ratification vvould further vveaken the İstanbul government vis-â-vis Anatolia, as the government vvould present the appearance of not merely having submitted to the treaty but of having vvelcomed it. 98 In his endeavours, Damad Ferid Paşa made three principal errors. Firstly, the integrity of his policies vvas vague and inconsistent. Yet his artificial leniency tovvards the Nationalists deceived only himself. When his policy seemed merciful tovvards the insurrectionists in Anatolia, he vvas accused of slackness, yet vvhen it vvas stern he vvas accused of over-severity. 99 Secondly, Damad Ferid Paşa vvas too illusory in expecting that the British vvould, financially and materially, support the İstanbul government for halting the Nationalists and for overcoming its ovvn financial difficulties. Moreover, as Tilley said, the administration of Turkey vvas to be so tied up vvith the foreign control commissions that it vvas difficult for the British to give special help, especially in vievv of the French and Italian spheres in Anatolia. 100 Lastly, it vvas mistake of Damad Ferid Paşa to imagine that the Nationalist Turks vvould agree drain the Sevres cup simply on account of a request by the İstanbul government. British, up to the last moment, resisted Defrance's suggestion for the removal of Damad Ferid Paşa from power, when it appeared to be inevitable the British High Commissioner bowed to the inevitable. 102 As Osbourne said, Defrance thus got his way concerning the replacement of Damad Ferid Paşa. 103 According to Osbourne, Damad Ferid Paşa's resignation 'fortunately' dispensed the British from interfering in Turkish politics. He also hoped that it would also deter the Sultan from abdication, a step which the British were strongly urging him not to contemplate. 104 Osbourne believed that the British must now try and get the new ministry to ratify at once and then set up the various commissions. 105 Similarly, Tilley was glad that Damad Ferid Paşa's resignation simplified British discussions with the French.
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CONCLUSION
Initially, the FO members had strongly believed that the primary requirement to solve the Turkish question was the ratification itself. For instance, Osbourne thought the mission to Ankara would have much greater chances of success after the ratification of the treaty. In Hankey's opinion, too, it was a great error to send a mission into Anatolia before ratification, since it would mean the bargaining with the Nationalist leader. Instead of dealing with Mustafa Kemal, Edmonds advised furnishing the İstanbul government's force with Allied funds and forces. However, the FO experts soon realised that it had been an illusion to hope that ratification would clear the ground for the pacification of Anatolia. They eventually admitted that an understanding with the Nationalists was the primary requirement before the ratification. The British FO, before applying to pacific solutions, considered principally two alternatives:
• enabling the İstanbul Government to restore order in Anatolia by giving it financial and material assistance; or • direct action by the Allied powers or, preferably, the Greeks.
As regards the first alternative, the FO members, especially Edmonds and Osbourne, had initially held hopes that a trained Turkish force could possibly suppress the Nationalist Movement. Edmonds feared, however, that if a government with strong Nationalist leanings were to come to power, it might allow these forces to be used for Nationalist ends. The
British were concerned about what would happen if the forces which Damad Ferid Paşa desired to raise proved untrustvvorthy. Although the İstanbul government had claimed that with the organisation of a force it could itself re-establish its authority and thus carry on with the ratification process, it was obvious that this would require time and money. The British FO thus favoured that no permission to raise such forces should be granted until after the ratification of the Turkish peace.
As regards the second alternative, the Allies were unable to undertake a joint campaign in Anatolia due to a " ~ Britain's companionship. As the British observed, the French had been divided into two camps, according to whether they desired to see a restored, though reduced, Turkey, or to deprive the Turks of the power to hurt them in Syria, Cilicia and Heraclea. 107 The French, with Nationalist aid, hoped to carry through a policy of economic and cultural penetration even though they knew that the Nationalist Movement was irreconcilable to their pretensions in Syria and the fiıture French zone of influence. 108 The Italians became rather the supporters of Nationalist Turkey in the struggle against an Anglo-Franco-Hellenic peace. 109 In other words, a joint Allied military intervention in Anatolia would not tolerate any breach in the alliance but there was no solid union on. the part of the Allies.
Since there was almost no hope for the application of direct action by the Allied povvers, the only available force in Allied hands seemed to be the further employment of the Greek forces. However, a new Greek advance into Anatolia could be realised only if:
• the Greeks would not require fresh compensation in return. Otherwise, this would mean a break över Turkish policy with the other Allies.
• it was certain of success. allies, France and Italy, were Allied
• it vvould not determine the Nationalists to further engage vvith the Bolsheviks, or, to oppress the Christians in the regions under Nationalist control.
• it vvould not have disastrous effects on the position and prestige of the Sultan-Caliph and his administration-as vvell as in istanbul itself. Moreover, there appeared a great scepticism among the British foreign policy departments as to the application of pro-Greek policies. Lloyd George, vvhose sympathy tovvards Venizelos never cooled, generated the pro-Greek solutions to prevent the treaty of Sevres from being overthrovvn by the Nationalists. He believed that, in return for territorial advantages in Anatolia, the Greeks could assume the chief burden of enforcing the Sevres provisions upon the Nationalist government. 112 The scepticism expressed by Montagu, Churchill, Wilson and Hardinge vvas shared by some inside the FO. But in many occasions they vvere unable to stop Lloyd George, vvho centralised a great part of British foreign policy-making mechanism in his ovvn hands and deliberately ignored the FO and neighbouring departments vvhen it suited him to do so." 3 By the mid-autumn of 1920, there was stili no real solution in the question of peace with Turkey. The British military authorities were constantly warning that if the period between signing and ratification were prolonged, the Allied presence in İstanbul might be at stake." 4 The FO members thus came to waive the alternative of a further application of the Greek army and to favour a smoother course, e.g. the method of conciliation, instead. As Robeck reported, the contention of the advocates of the method of conciliation vvas such that: having regard to the exhausted state of the Anatolian population, the dissension among the Nationalist leaders, and Mustafa Kemal's failure to contest the latest Greek advance, there vvas at least a hope that the situation might be represented to the bulk of the rebels in such a light as to rally them round the Sultan's government on the basis of acquiescence in the treaty. 115 The FO members, vvho alvvays urged the vievv that the Sultan or his ministry had to ratify the treaty since the Ottoman Empire vvas the one vvho had been defeated in the War, fınally agreed that the Allies should urge sending a mission to the Nationalists (the French said 'vvithout', the High Commissioner said 'vvith' Allied officers), but certainly not drive the Sultan to abdicate. 116 They, though in agreement vvith the necessity of a mission of pacification to Anatolia, had stili different vievvs on the issue of vvhether the Allies should accompany the mission or not. While Osbourne supported the French objections to the mission being accompanied by Allied representatives in case of a rebuff, Hankey and Fitzmaurice regarded the mission being accompanied by Allied representatives as advantageous.
In conclusion, it may be said that Damad Ferid Paşa's priorities vvere the suppression of the Nationalist Movement and the relief of his government's financiai difficulties. But the FO savv them as a matter of secondary importance in comparison to the matter of ratification. While the British High Commissioner clearly vvarned the FO that even if Damad Ferid Paşa ratified the treaty his extreme unpopularity might handicap him so greatly as to make his retention in office impossible, neither the FO nor the British High Commission could stop themselves from regarding Damad Ferid Paşa to be the only Grand Vizier for the execution of the treaty of Sevres. 117 Hovvever, even if they had not regarded him so and they had brought to povver a modest Grand Vizier much earlier, it was almost certain, as Osbourne drew attention to, that no new Grand Vizier could solve the Anatolian enigma if at the same time Turkey was forced to a reluctant peace. Damad Ferid Paşa askerî güç oluşturma önerileriyle İtilaf kanadını zorlarken, riskleri göze alamayan İngilizlerin 1920 yılının sonbaharında 'ılımlı' politikalara daha çok rağbet ettiği ve İngiliz dışişleri uzmanlarının -birkaç istisna dışında-Anadolu'ya uzlaşma heyeti göndermeyi tercih etmeye başladığı görüldü. Örneğin, Venizelos'un çok fazla bir toprak talebinde bulunmaması ve Yunanlıların Milli Mücadelecilere karşı başarı kazanması ihtimalinin yüksek olması şartıyla, Yunan askerî müdahelesinin bazı dezavantajlanna rağmen en iyi çözüm olacağını savunan Osbourne bile, Anadolu'ya gönderilecek bir uzlaşma heyetinin yararlı olabileceğini düşünmeye başladı. Öte yandan, örneğin Tilley, Yunan askeri gücünün Milli Mücadelecilere karşı kullanılmasını savunmaya devam etti. Edmonds'a göre ise, Mustafa Kemal ile uzlaşmaya çalışmak, ona saygınlık kazandıracaktı. Bu nedenle Edmonds, öncelikle İstanbul hükümetinin gücünün artırılması ve böylece saygınlığı artacak olan merkezî hükümetin bu gibi isyancılarla kendi başına uğraşması gerektiğine inanmaktaydı.
Makalenin
1920 Ekimi'nde Milli Mücadelecilerin barışçıl yöntemlerle etkisizleştirilmesini daha az masraflı ve daha az riskli bulan İtilaf devletleri, İstanbul hükümeti tarafından Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi gerektiğinde hemfikir oldular. Fakat gönderilecek heyetin yetkileri, niteliği ve gönderilme zamanı konusunda uzlaşma sağlanamadı. İtilaf devletleri bir çıkar yol ararken, Damad Ferid Paşa, Milli Mücadelecilere yönelik politikalarında ısrar ettiği gibi, Sultan'ın tahtından feragat edebileceği tehdidiyle İtilaf kanadını daha da zor bir duruma soktu. Sorun, sonunda, Anadolu'ya bir uzlaşma heyeti gönderilmesine sıcak bakmayan Damad Ferid Paşa'nın istifasıyla kısmen çözüm buldu. İstanbul'daki Fransız Yüksek Komiseri Defrance'nin -özellikle İngilizlerle olan yakın diyalogundan ötürü-antipati beslediği Damad Ferid Paşa'nın sadrazamlıktan ayrılmasının ardından, İngiliz-Fransız ilişkilerinde beliren gerginlik azaldığı gibi, Milli Mücadelecileri zor kullanarak yıldırmanın zorluğunu kabullenmiş görünen İngiliz dış politika çevreleri, yeni İstanbul hükümetinin Anadolu ile uzlaşabilecek ılımlı kişilerden oluşmasına da destek verdiler. Böylece politik arenada, Damad Ferid Paşa'nın etkin olarak artık yer almayacağı ancak Ankara'nın daha çok söz sahibi olacağı yeni bir dönemin ilk sinyallerinden biri verilmiş oldu.
